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On 23 January 2020, the government of the People’s Republic of China imposed
a quarantine on the central Chinese city of Wuhan, population eleven million. The
quarantine measures, designed to counter the spread of the coronavirus, which is
believed to have originated in the city, include a ban on trains and flights leaving
the city and health checks for anyone leaving Wuhan by private car. Residents
were instructed to stay in Wuhan unless they could provide ‘special reasons’ for
leaving. The announcement of these measures was followed by a rush of people
to the main train station and airport, and to hospitals to be tested for the virus,
long queues for petrol, shortages of medical equipment and price inflation of food
staples as residents sought to build stockpiles. The Financial Times reported that
the ‘atmosphere was of a city preparing for a siege rather than Spring Festival
celebrations’. The following day, China expanded the travel shutdowns to cover
twelve cities with a combined population of over 36 million people.
I mention this developing situation to reinforce the cautionary trend in this debate
over the merits and prospects of ‘urban citizenship’. What the Wuhan story vividly
demonstrates is that the state retains the ability to impose a ‘state of exception’
on cities as on other territories within its control (Grimm 2015). The ability of a city
resident to oppose such sovereign acts through the assertion of rights derived from
‘urban citizenship’ is lacking in an authoritarian context, but also appears limited in
the context of democratic political systems.
Rainer Bauböck opened this debate by asking whether the demographic rise of
cities presages a corresponding ‘decline of nation-states and a rise of cities as
the dominant arenas of politics, democracy and citizenship’. In this context, is
it meaningful to speak of ‘urban citizenship’, and can it be ‘emancipated’ from
nationality? The notion of emancipation is applied both narrowly (to mean delinking
‘urban citizenship’ from a requirement to possess the nationality of the host state)
and broadly (‘the emancipation of cities from the chokehold of the nation-state’). I
share Bauböck’s ambivalence regarding the possibilities of ‘urban citizenship’, yet
I question whether ‘citizenship’ is an apt concept for describing or encouraging the
important role of cities.
I would like to make four somewhat related observations. First, as the Wuhan case
illustrates, domestically the state’s preponderance of – legal and actual – powers
tightly constrains the ability of cities to offer legally meaningful ‘citizenship’ to their
residents. As Ralf Dahrendorf observed, citizenship is, ‘to begin with, an idea
which finds its expression in law’ – it creates a ‘community under law’ in which the
- 1 -
privileged category of ‘citizen’ can exercise legal rights (Dahrendorf 1974). While city
residents are often granted legal rights by virtue of their residency (e.g. the right to
vote in municipal elections), such rights tend to be subordinate to the state’s legal
order (city ordinances might be ruled unconstitutional), which is ultimately backed by
the possibility of coercive enforcement. If, as the saying goes, a language is a dialect
with an army and a navy, then ‘urban citizenship’ belongs decidedly to the category
of ‘dialect’ rather than ‘language’.
Not quite the ‘end of power’
Second, on the international plane, states remain key building blocks of global
governance, both in general and as providers of citizenship (or nationality) to natural
persons (as well as to corporations, ships, etc.) in particular. While the agency of
contemporary governments is indeed challenged and constrained by powerful non-
state actors, such as transnational corporations and rating agencies (see, e.g.,
Naím 2014), states retain the ability to negotiate and to implement international
agreements. It is often – and correctly – noted that states are failing to ‘solve’
global problems and that cities and other non-state actors are trying to pick up
the slack. And yet, climate change, extinctions, pandemics, terrorism, etc., remain
collective action problems. If coordinating almost two hundred states is difficult,
I am not convinced that negotiating among hundreds or perhaps thousands of
cities will be easier. Moreover, states tend to have great control over the means of
implementation of international agreements.
The issue of refugees and asylum seekers is instructive. Certainly, a progressive
and well-resourced city administration can ameliorate the harsh edges or neglect
of national policy (although a progressive balance of forces in city politics is far
from guaranteed, as Enrico Gargiulo and Lorenzo Piccoli demonstrate in their
discussion of ‘mean cities’). However, the most progressive city administration,
offering both abundant services to refugees and campaigning leadership consistent
with the politics of its educated and cosmopolitan electorate, will be unable to
prevent a national government from flouting its obligations under the Refugee
Convention, for example, by turning away asylum seekers or punishing them for their
irregular arrival. Since the preponderance of power is at the national level, surely
the focus should be on getting the national policy settings right, and then on trying
to strengthen international cooperation (such as through the negotiation of a Global
Compact for Migration). In a democracy, the citizens who need to be convinced for
any of this to really happen are the citizens of the whole country.
Citizenship is also integral to the unique role of states in global governance. It
matters internationally because it enables individuals to claim protections under
international law. There is no prospect for cities (which generally are not subjects
of international law) to replicate this role. To take one example: the flight of
businessman Carlos Ghosn from pre-trial detention in Japan to the safe haven of
his native Lebanon. This colourful episode illustrates what Alex Aleinikoff refers to
as the ‘relationship of citizenship to sovereignty’. It is Ghosn’s good fortune that
among his three disclosed citizenships is one of Lebanon, a state which has no
extradition agreement with Japan and which, as a matter of sovereign prerogative,
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generally does not extradite its citizens. From the perspective of a fugitive from
justice (or indeed from injustice), this is a citizenship worth having, one with (quoting
Aleinikoff) a ‘pay-off in the real world’. Lebanon is widely regarded as a troubled and
not especially powerful state, but the citizenship that even such a state can confer is
worth far more to someone in Carlos Ghosn’s position than the notional ‘citizenship’
of any great metropolis. The reason is the general acceptance of the legal fiction of
‘state sovereignty’ and the corresponding dearth of acceptance of any notion of ‘city
sovereignty’. This does not mean that ‘urban citizenship’ would be a bad thing, but it
illustrates the distance between the concept and having anything like the impact that
state citizenship has in the real world.
Cities as subjects of multipolarity
Third, faced with essentially global challenges requiring coordination among large
powers, it seems more apt to encourage the emergence of larger communities
of political organisation and solidarity (such as through the development of EU
citizenship) than to focus on the construction of local polities. Today there can be no
city that ‘is sufficient for herself both in peace and war’, as Perikles once boasted of
Athens. Rather, cities must secure their interests not just in partnership with each
other, but through close cooperation with national and provincial governments, the
private sector, international and supranational institutions, standard-setters, and a
host of other influential actors.
While there are forces of both integration and disintegration at work in the world,
there is a clear trend favouring the cohering of multiple poles of power. The
European Union is unique in its breadth and depth as a legal order, but there are
other significant examples, such as the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic
Union, the ASEAN Community, and initiatives to deepen market integration within
the African Union. Beyond regional ordering, there is competition to shape global
standards and transnational value chains (see, for example, China’s Belt and
Road Initiative, or the contests over whose companies will dominate 5G and AI
technologies). In sum, Yevgeny Primakov’s prediction of multipolarity as ‘the main
vector of the world’s development’ appears to have been borne out (Primakov,
2003).
In a multipolar world system, scale – measured in economic and geopolitical power
more than in simple population size – is a key factor determining the ability of an
entity to make truly independent choices. Regarding the EU, it has sometimes been
said that there are only two kinds of EU Member States: small states, and states that
have yet to figure out that they are small. On their own, even the largest EU Member
States would be in inferior bargaining positions to greater powers. However, as the
world’s largest trading bloc, the EU can collectively defend its citizens’ interests and
preferences through measures such as the General Data Protection Regulation and
the European Green Deal. A corollary of this dynamic is that cities are essentially on
the receiving end of multipolarity, able to exploit the opportunities or cope with the
fallout of tectonic movements and frictions – e.g. the impacts of the US-China ‘trade
war’ on a place like Hong Kong.
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In a world of collective action problems, we should be seeking the expansion of
solidarities, not their concentration. In a multipolar system, those of us who are in
favour of liberal democracy also have the challenge to make transnational blocs
more democratic. For example, in the case of the EU, members of the European
Parliament elected from transnational lists would help to connect the European polity
to its legislative process more directly. (While the EU is the clearest example of the
‘transnational’ aspect of the new citizenship narrative outlined by Bauböck, there are
also developments in transnational participation and accountability in other regions
– although we should not expect them to correspond to the EU model.)  None of this
is to deny that cities and local democracy have important roles to play, but these are
better seen as building blocks of larger entities that can have far greater impact and
can more capably defend citizen interests.
Participation and engagement, not citizenship
Fourth, and finally, even given the enduring domestic power of states, the ongoing
significance of national citizenship and the emergence of a multipolar international
system, there is no doubt that cities have untapped potential to contribute to
tackling global challenges. However, I question whether ‘urban citizenship’ is
the concept best-suited for unlocking this potential. Previous contributors to this
debate have observed that ‘urban citizenship’ is not an alternative to national
citizenship, and some have argued that the two can coexist (but see, contra,
Josephine van Zeben’s contribution). Even allowing for this coexistence, every
choice has an opportunity cost. My view is that focusing on developing ‘urban
citizenship’ risks missing the need to address the role that cities can play in tandem
with other important actors. So, while I would not go as far as Avigail Eisenberg
in doubting that ‘enhancing urban democracy will help meet the global challenges
we confront today’, I do believe that a focus on internal city developments would
miss more important dynamics. As Nir Barak observes, city networks such as
the C40 have had real impacts on climate policy, but cities nevertheless ‘lack the
capacity’ to solve the climate crisis in isolation from other actors. On the other
hand, cities are key contributors to multi-stakeholder collaborations alongside
national and provincial governments, the research sector, business and international
organisations (Dodds, 2015). Multi-stakeholder partnerships aim to mobilise
the distinct resources of each participant to meet a shared challenge, such as
the various Sustainable Development Goals. Sustained focus on how cities can
contribute to such partnerships would certainly be in keeping with the urgent
challenges we face.
To conclude, while I support city residency rights that are not conditional on
nationality, as suggested by Bauböck, I agree with Sandra Seubert that citizenship
based on minimum residency requirements (or, alternatively, residency status based
on maximal rights) is equally possible and desirable at the national level. Many
countries already provide for this. I am also sceptical of the prospects and desirability
of emancipating ‘urban citizenship’ from the nation-state in the broader sense. Cities
are irreplaceable centres of creativity, capital and policy experimentation, but they
are not going to become unmoored from their national hinterlands anytime soon,
any more than an independent London is going to remain in the EU. Rather, the
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challenge and opportunity are to harness the unique potential of cities within the
context of national and, increasingly, supranational entities.
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